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BMW of North America v. Gore:* A

Misplaced Guide for Punitive Damage
Awards
I.

INTRODUCTION

Punitive damage awards are not new. They have a long pedigree,
dating back two thousand years before Christ.1 Throughout this time,
punitive damages have been sought to serve a number of important penal
functions, including punishing the defendant and deterring the defendant and
others from tortious conduct.' Some court decisions have even mentioned
that punitive damages provide the plaintiff with compensation for damages
such as humiliation and litigation expenses
Despite these meritorious goals, punitive damages have come under
rigorous attack. One attack against punitive damages has been that they do
not result in optimal deterrence, if any deterrence at all, because the
majority of jurisdictions allow defendants to insure against punitive damage
claims. 4 Another argument to the contrary has been that punitive damages
* No. 94-896 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
1. James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., PunitiveDamages:A Relic That Has OutlivedIts Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1119 (1984) (punitive damages' origin extends as
far back as 2000 B.C. in the Code of Hammurabi). Reported punitive damage awards in the
United States date at least as far back as 1784. See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6
(1784).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 908 (1979).
1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and
to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because
of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.
In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character
of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the
defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at
9 (5th ed. 1984); see, e.g., Brewer v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 434 P.2d 828 (Kan. 1967); Cox
v. Stolworthy, 496 P.2d 682 (Idaho 1972).
4. See, e.g., Sales & Cole, supra note I, at 1163. However, this argument does not
seem to take into account that defendants may be affected by a rise in insurance premiums,
that defendants who are repetitively held liable for punitive damages may be denied coverage
for punitive damages, and that insurers may require defendants to take certain precautions to
qualify for coverage. Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of NeoclassicalTort
Reform, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1765, 1771 n.5'4 (1996).
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lead to overdeterrence because defendants act overly cautious for fear of
uncertain liability.' A third argument against punitive damages has been
that punitive damages encourage excessive litigation, whereby defendants
are more likely to settle in order to avoid the uncertainty of trial6 and to
avoid filing punitive damage claims on required reporting documents that
can be troubling to lenders, accountants, and governmental agencies. 7
Lastly, another argument has been that it is unfair to award plaintiffs
windfalls when they have already been fully compensated."
Through an examination of significant Supreme Court cases, this
casenote seeks to unfold the controversy over punitive damage awards.
Beginning with the Court's examination of statutory awards of punitive
damages, this note traces the controversy to the modem issues of jury
awards of punitive damages. It illuminates the Court's willingness to limit
punitive damages and its ambiguity in doing so. The Court's eagerness to
limit punitive damage awards and its vagueness in accomplishing such
constraints are exemplified in BMW of North America v. Gore,9 which this
note will discuss and analyze. Finally, this note will propose a more
meaningful approach to the punitive damages issue and discuss the
troublesome implications that BMW of North America v. Gore'0 will have
on the area of punitive damage awards.
II.

CASE HISTORY

At the turn of this century, objections to punitive damage awards
challenged state discretion to punish wrongdoers pursuant to a statutory
scheme." One of the earlier cases involving a challenge to a statutory
scheme was SeaboardAir Line Railway v. A.L. Seegers. 2 Here, a common
carrier challenged a South Carolina statute that required common carriers to
5. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., PunitiveDamages, Due Process,and the Jury, 40
ALA. L. REV. 975, 988 (1989).
6. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 437, 448 (1988); David Rosenberg & Steven A. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are
Broughtfor Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3-6 (1985).
7. Jeffry Jontz, BusinessCommunity Troubledby ExcessivePunitiveDamageAwards,
ORLANDO Bus. J., Aug. 9, 1996, at 1.
8. LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(2),
at 26-28 (2d ed. 1989).
9. No. 94-896 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
10. Id.
11. Rita Kelley Franco, Note, TXO Production Corporation v. Alliance Resources
Corporation: The United States Supreme Court's EquivocalReply to the PunitiveDamages
Predicament,27 CoNN. L. REv. 735, 738 (1995).

12. 207 U.S. 73 (1907).
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pay for loss or damage to intrastate shipments within forty days of the filing
of a claim or be subject to a fifty dollar penalty for each failure or
refusal. 3 The basis of the challenge was that the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was no
justification for the legislature to compel carriers to pay their debts under a
4 The Court
threat of an unreasonable penalty for delay and not others.
held that the common carriers were not denied equal protection guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment 5 since the statute's goal was not to penalize
carriers for late payments but to encourage prompt settlements. The Court
concluded the penalty deterred the carrier's refusals to settle just claims and
compensated the claimant for the suit created by the carrier's own actions. 6 The Court, nevertheless, found that "there are limits beyond which
penalties may not go . . . . "7 Without actually discussing those limits,
however, the Court refused to hold that this penalty was beyond the state's
power. 18
A similar challenge to a state statutory penalty was made in WatersPierce Oil Co. v. Texas.' 9 This case involved Texas anti-trust laws that
allowed for the penalizing of a foreign corporation for violations of the antitrust act, including forfeiting the corporation's permit to do business in
Texas except as to its interstate business.20 The Court upheld the law and
hinted at possible due process limits on fines if "the fines imposed are so
grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law."'"
22
Likewise, in Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher,
a telephone company challenged an Arkansas statute that provided for
patrons of a telephone company to recover penalties at the rate of a hundred
dollars per day in discrimination cases.23 The Court set aside a penalty
against the telephone company on the basis that it was "so plainly arbitrary
and oppressive as to be nothing short of a taking of its property without due

13. Id. at 75-76.

14. Id. at 76.
15. Id.at 77.
16. Id.

17. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. A.L. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907).
18. Id. at 78-9.
19. 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
20. Id. at 96.

21. Id. at 111 (citing Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659 (1907)).
22. 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
23. Id.at 485. The patron in this case was pursuing sixty-three days worth of
penalties. Id.
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'
process of law."24
Danaher did not establish any guidelines, but it did
encourage the Court to examine possible due process limits on punitive
damages awards. 5
Unlike these earlier cases, the Supreme Court cases from the last
decade have not dealt so much with the imposition of penalties under state
statutes. Rather, they have focused primarily on jury awards of exemplary
damages.26 Nevertheless, as with the earlier cases, the Supreme Court has
been ambiguous in providing adequate guidance for the lower courts in
determining whether a penalty is a deprivation of property without due
process.2 7
This uncertainty in reviewing jury awards of punitive damages on due
process grounds is evident in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie.2" In
Lavoie, the defendant insurance company contended that punitive damages
awarded by a jury violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment2 9 and that lack of adequate state standards governing punitive
damages awards violated the Due Process Clause- of the Fourteenth
Amendment. a" The Supreme Court, although it based its decision on
another ground,3 ' hinted that the defendant's "arguments raise important
'
issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved."32
The Court's lack of direction in reviewing jury awards for punitive
damages continued in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw." In

24. Id. at 491.

25. The Court's willingness to inquire into due process limits on punitive damage
awards is evidenced by St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63
(1919). In this case, an Arkansas statute regulated railroad rates and prescribed a penalty of
between fifty and three hundred dollars and costs of suit should a railroad demand or collect
greater rates than the statute prescribed. Id. at 64. Using Waters-Pierce Oil Co. and Seaboard
Air Line Ry. as precedents, the Supreme Court upheld the statute against a constitutional
attack that the penalty was repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 67.
26. Franco, supra note 11, at 739.
27. Id.

28. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
29. Id. at 828. According to the Eighth Amendment, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.

30. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986).
31. The Court passed on the due process claims against the punitive damage award and
held that the defendant insurance company's due process rights had been violated because a
state supreme court judge who affirmed the decision may have been biased against the
insurance company. See id.
32. Id. at 828-29.
33. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
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Crenshaw, the defendant insurance company appealed a jury award for
punitive damages, claiming that it was excessive, did not reasonably further
any legitimate purpose, and was contrary to the Constitution.34 The Court
refused to rule on any constitutional issues because they were not properly
raised in the lower court.35 Justice O'Connor, who concurred in part and
in judgment, nevertheless left the door open for review of punitive damage
awards by noting that the defendant "touched on a due process issue that I
think is worthy of the Court's attention in an appropriate case."36
As in Crenshaw,the Court in Browning-FerrisIndustries,Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., passed on the due process challenge to a punitive damage
award.3" Here, a defendant in an anti-trust action appealed from a jury
award for punitive damages, asserting that the award violated the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, that the award violated due process,
and that the award was excessive as a matter of federal common law.39
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the award violated the
Excessive Fines Clause because the history and purpose of the Eighth
Amendment was that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to Government
attempts to punish criminals, not to punitive damages between private
parties.40 The Court likewise rejected that the award was excessive as a
matter of federal common law on the grounds that determining excessiveness of exemplary damages should be left to the states, not federal common
law.4" ' In addition, the Court bypassed the due process challenge because it
had not been preserved at trial.42 Nonetheless, the evidence grew stronger
that the Court would be willing to address due process challenges to
excessive punitive damages under the appropriate circumstances.43

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
492 U.S. 257 (1989).

38. Id. at 277.
39. Id. at 259-77.
40. Id. at 260.
41. Id. at 279.
42. Browning-Ferris Indust. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 277 (1989). The
Court noted that, although the Due Process Clause restricts the size of penalties under a

statutory scheme, the question as to whether the Due Process Clause confines jury discretion
to award punitive damages in absence of a statute had never been addressed. Id. at 276-77.

Here, once again, the issue had not been preserved, and the question was left for another day.
Id. at 277.
43. The concurring opinions urged that jury awards for exemplary damages must not
be left unchecked. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, felt it necessary to allow due
process constraints on the imposition of punitive damages under the appropriate circumstances. See id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J. concurring). Justice Brennan stated that "[w]ithout

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

It was not until Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip4"that the
Court articulated a standard to determine whether punitive damage awards
by juries could violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Haslip,,insureds sued a life insurer and its agent for fraud, alleging
that they paid premium payments to the agent and the agent failed to notify
them that their policy had been canceled.4 5 The jury awarded the insureds
punitive damages of approximately $840,000, more than four times the
amount of compensatory damages.4 " The award was appealed on due
process grounds, but the Court upheld the award."'
The Court began its reasoning by noting that the common-law method
for determining exemplary damages is not per se unconstitutional as to deny
due process.4' The Court nevertheless conceded that unlimited judicial discretion in assessing punitive damages may exceed constitutional boundaries."9 The Court also agreed that, in regard to a standard for jury awards,
"a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case" would be impossible.50 The Court, however, did find that "general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the courts when the case is tried to a jury
properly enter into the constitutional calculus."'" Applying this notion, the
Court found Alabama's procedural protection, including the jury charge, the
post-verdict hearing, and the appellate review, provided adequate guidance 52 and the award, in light of other potential punishments, as reasonable. 3

statutory (or at least common-law) standards for the determination of how large an award of
punitive damages is appropriate in a given case, juries are left largely to themselves in
making this important, and potentially devastating, decision." Id. at 281. Similarly, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, observed that awards of punitive damages have been
rapidly increasing, and, although this is not an appropriate case for a due process challenge
to a punitive damage award, "nothing in the Court's opinion forecloses a due process
challenge to awards of punitive damages or the method by which they are imposed ..."Id.

at 282-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

44. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 7 n.2.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id. at 17.
49. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. Rejecting the need for the Court to apply a "reasonableness" standard, Justice
Scalia, concurring only in judgment, reviewed the long tradition of American courts that has
left punitive damages to jury discretion and concluded that, so long as the evidence supports
the imposition of such damages, due process is satisfied. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.

19971
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Justice O'Connor's lone dissent objected to the vagueness of the jury
instructions in this case.54 Justice O'Connor looked to Matthews, v.
Eldridge," a case the Court uses to determine whether the process
provided is enough to satisfy the requirements of due process by balancing
three factors: (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk that existing
procedures will wrongly impair this private interest and the likelihood that
additional procedural safeguards can effect a cure, and (3) the government's
interest.56 After applying the three factors from Eldridge,Justice O'Connor
concluded that Alabama failed to provide the jury with meaningful guidance
in the application of its laws in violation of due process." To protect
against future due process violations of jury awards, Justice O'Connor
proposed that the State, not the Supreme Court, should constrain juries'
discretion in determining whether to impose punitive damages and in fixing
the amount of such awards through its legislature or its courts."
Two years later, the Court similarly addressed a jury award in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp." In this case, TXO Production Corp. was sued under a counterclaim for slander of title.6' The jury
found against TXO Production Corp. and awarded Alliance Resources Corp.
nineteen thousand dollars in compensatory damages and ten million dollars
in exemplary damages.61 TXO Production Corp. appealed, claiming that
the punitive damage award was so grossly excessive as to constitute a denial
of due process.62 A plurality of the Court, however, upheld the award as
reasonable.63 In doing so, the Court again rejected a specific test to
determine if an award is grossly excessive and instead applied the flexible
"reasonableness" test espoused in Haslip." The Court noted that a jury
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). At most, Justice Scalia contended
that the trial court should offer some review of a jury award and a new trial should be
granted only if a verdict is found excessive. Id.

54. Id. at 44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
55. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
56. Id. at 335.

57. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 53-63 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
58. Id. at 63.
59. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).

60. Id. at 447.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 452.
63. Id. at 458-62.
64. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993). In
dissent, Justice O'Connor chided the plurality for its "reasonableness" standard as providing
no guidance for courts in evaluating punitive damage awards and stressed the need for some
type of objective criteria in order to avoid that element of subjectivity which would foreclose
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must consider various factors unique to the particular case before it.65

One year later, the Court's momentum in judicial review over jury
awards of punitive damages for due process defects grew even stronger in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg." In this case, Oberg brought a products
liability suit against Honda for the manufacture of an all-terrain vehicle after
he was injured in an accident.67
The trial court awarded Oberg
$735,512.31 in compensatory damages and five million dollars in punitive
damages.6" This award was affirmed by the Oregon Supreme Court.69
Honda challenged an amendment to the Oregon Constitution that prohibited
judicial review of exemplary damages awarded by a jury "unless the court
can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict."7 °
The Supreme Court struck down the amendment as violating the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The Court analyzed the
amendment to Oregon's Constitution in light of the historical common law
judicial review of punitive damages and concluded that Oregon's amendment was an unjustified departure.72 More importantly, the Court reiterated
the need to review jury awards of punitive damages in order to ensure that
awards are not so grossly excessive as to deny due process." The Court
also repeated that the majority of justices have concluded that the Due
Process Clause imposes limits on punitive damage awards, even though they
failed to define those limits.74
HI. BMW OF NORTHAmE
A.

CA v. GORE

THE FACTS

The Court finally broke its chain of ambiguity in defining limits on
punitive damages and set out to establish due process limitations in BMW

a real evaluation of an exemplary damage award. Id. at 480-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 457.
66. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
67. Id.
68. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 814 P.2d 517, 519 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
69. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 426-32. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, foundthat Oregon provides adequate due process protection before a case can go
to the jury. Id. at 450-51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994).
74. Id.
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of North America v. Gore.75 This case began as a result of BMW of North
America's nationwide policy involving BMW's that were damaged in the
course of manufacture or transportation, whereby only if the cost of
repairing the damage exceeded three percent of the car's suggested retail
price was the BMW sold as used.76 Otherwise, the BMW was sold as new
77 This
without disclosing to the dealer that any repairs had been made.
policy had been in effect since 1983 and had been applied to Ira Gore's
BMW purchase.78
Several months after buying his "brand new" BMW for $40,750.88
from a Birmingham dealer, Gore took his BMW to an independent dealer
to have it detailed. Much to Gore's surprise, he learned from the dealer
that his car had been refinished. Upset, Gore filed suit against BMW of
North America, the American distributor of BMW's, alleging that the failure
to disclose that his car had been repainted was suppression of a material
fact.8
In his complaint, Gore prayed for five hundred thousand dollars in
actual and punitive damages and costs; however, Gore later asked for four
82
thousand dollars in compensatory damages and four million dollars in
punitive damages.83 In order to support this punitive damage award, Gore
84
BMW
looked to BMW's nondisclosure policy's impact nationwide.
that
BMW's
as
much
as
worth
were
BMW's
refinished
the
that
responded
value
cars'
refinished
the
in
belief
faith
had not been repainted, that its good

75. No. 94-896 (U.S. May 20, 1996).

76. Id. at 2.
77. Id.
78. Id. Here, BMW did not disclose to the Birmingham dealer that Gore's car had

been repainted because the $601.37 cost of repainting was about 1.5% of its suggested retail
price. Id.
79. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896 (U.S. May 20, 1996).

80. Id.
81. Id. at 2. In Alabama, common law fraud is codified. The statute provides that

"[s]uppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate
constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations
of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case." ALA.CODE § 6-5-102 (1993).
82. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 2-3 (U.S. May 20, 1996). Gore

relied on the testimony of a former dealer, who estimated that the value of his repainted
BMW was about ten percent less, or four thousand dollars, than the value of a new car that
had not been refinished. Id. at 3.
83. Id.
84. Id. Gore's review of this policy established that BMW had sold approximately one
thousand cars nationwide for more than they were worth. Id.
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made punitive damages inappropriate, and that transactions in jurisdictions
outside Alabama had no relevance to Gore's claim. 5

B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

BMW's argument was to no avail as the jury awarded Gore his four

thousand dollars in compensatory damages and, because they found that
BMW's nondisclosure policy constituted "gross, oppressive or malicious

fraud,"" four million dollars in exemplary damages.8 7 Undoubtedly
astounded by the punitive damage award, BMW filed a post-trial motion to

set it aside. 8 To support the motion, the company introduced evidence
that its nondisclosure policy was legal in twenty-five states.8 9 In addition,
BMW argued that its nondisclosure policy was never ruled to be unlawful

in Alabama prior to this case. 90 Responding to BMW's motion, Gore

asserted that, in spite of the fact the policy was not adjudged to be unlawful,
the company received a number of customer complaints regarding undisclosed repairs and settled some lawsuits. 9' Gore further argued that other
States' disclosure statutes were immaterial because BMW had failed to show
how these disclosure statutes supplanted existing causes of action for fraud
under common law.92
At the outset, the trial judge held that the award was not excessive and
denied BMW's post-trial motion. 93 On appeal, the Alabama Supreme
Court upheld the trial judge's decision 94 based on the factors espoused in
85. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 3 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
86. Id. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20, 6-11-21 (1993). According to § 6-11-20(a),
"[p]unitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action, except civil actions for wrongful
death pursuant to Sections 6-5-391 and 6-5-410, other than in a tort action where it is proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in
oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." Id. § 6-11-21 limits
a punitive damages award to $250,000, unless based upon any of the following: "(1) A
pattern or practice of intentional wrongful conduct, even though the damage or injury was
inflicted only on the plaintiff; or, (2) Conduct involving actual malice other than fraud or bad
faith not a part of a pattern or practice; or, (3) Libel, slander, or defamation." Id.
87. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 3 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 4. Shortly before Gore's case went to trial, an Alabama jury did find that
BMW's nondisclosure policy constituted fraud. Yates v. BMW of N. Am., 642 So.2d 937
(Ala. 1993). In Yates, the jury awarded a comparable amount of compensatory damages but
did not award any punitive damages. Id.
91. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 5 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 646 So.2d 619 (Ala. 1994).
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Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby95 and endorsed by PacificMutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip 6 Essentially, the Alabama Supreme Court established
guidelines to review jury awards of exemplary damages on the following
factors: (1) the relationship of punitive damages to the potential harm that
could occur from the defendant's conduct as well as to the harm that
actually occurred, (2) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, (3) the profitability to the defendant from his conduct, (4) the
wealth of the defendant, (5) the costs of litigation, (6) criminal sanctions
other civil
against the defendant arising out of the same conduct, and (7)
9 7
conduct.
same
the
of
out
arising
actions against the defendant
Using this test, the Alabama Supreme Court found that BMW profited
8 The court concluded that
from its reprehensible nondisclosure policy.
BMW's wealth is such that the award would not have a substantial impact
on BMW, that the litigation costs to Gore were substantial, and that the
award was reasonably related to both the potential and actual harm to
Gore.99 BMW did, however, win on its contention that the jury should not
00
look to the sales in other jurisdictions.' As a result of the jury's reliance
on actions outside Alabama's jurisdiction, the Alabama Supreme Court
concluded that the jury's verdict was tainted, and the court ordered a
remittitur of the punitive damage award from four million to two million
Accordingly,
dollars, which it found to be constitutionally reasonable.'
States
United
the
by
granted
was
which
BMW applied for certiorari,
will
that
standard
the
Supreme Court so as to illuminate "the character of
02
identify constitutionally excessive awards" of punitive damages.
C.

THE DECISION

Justice Stevens delivered the five to four majority opinion and began
the Court's inquiry by noting that in this federal system the states necessarily have substantial flexibility in determining limits on exemplary damages. °3 The Court likewise noted that most states in turn allow the jury

95. 539 So.2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989).
96. 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991).
97. 646 So.2d 619, 624 (Ala. 1994).
98. Id. at 625.
99. Id. at 625-28.
100. Id. at 628.
101. Id. at 628-29. The Alabama Supreme Court did not explain why two million
dollars was constitutionally reasonable. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 6
n. 10 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
102. Id. at 7 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994)).
103. Id.
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similar latitude in assessing punitive damages, requiring that the award be
reasonable in vindicating the state's interest in punishing unlawful conduct
and deterring its repetition. °4 Only when an exemplary damage award is
"grossly excessive" in relation to these state interests, the Court reasoned,
does the award violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend05
ment.1
Justice Stevens then determined that a possible state interest in this case
is a state's interest in protecting its citizens from deceptive trade practices
by mandating disclosure of presale repairs of automobiles.'0 6 The Court,
however, interjected that the states do not, and need not, protect their
citizens against nondisclosure policies in the same manner without
congressional intervention.' 7 Since Congress was silent on BMW's
nondisclosure policy, the issue was left to the individual states.'0 8 Consequently, comity and state sovereignty demand that states sanction violators
of their laws, but they may not do so with the intent of changing the
tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other states.'0 9
The Court then applied these principles of state comity and sovereignty
to Gore's argument for punitive damages based on BMW's nationwide
policy of nondisclosure, even though such nondisclosure was lawful in those
states, and concluded that Gore's argument infringed on other states' policy
choices."0 As a result of the trial judge's acceptance of Gore's argument,
the jury. award was tainted, and BMW's conduct must be re-evaluated in
light of Alabama consumers only."'
When an Alabama court is properly limited, the Court continued, the
jury award will be shown to be grossly excessive based on the following
three guideposts: the degree of reprehensibility of BMW's nondisclosure; the
ratio between Gore's actual or potential harm and his punitive damage
award; and the difference between this remedy and other sanctions for
comparable misconduct."' According to the Court, these three guideposts
will show that BMW did not receive the constitutional fair notice required
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 8 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
107. Id. at 8-10. The Court noted that states have adopted various approaches ranging
from no regulation whatsoever (allowing the distributor's self-interest in its good will to
dictate disclosure to consumers) to affirmative regulation by a state'sjudiciary or legislature,
resulting in a patchwork of rules. Id.
108. See Id.
109. Id. at 11.
.110. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 11-12 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
111. Id.at 12-13.
112. Id. at 14.
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it was not informed of how severe a penalty
under due process because
13
Alabama may impose."
The Court then discussed these three guideposts in detail, beginning
with what it believed to be the most indicative of the reasonableness of the
punitive damage award: the degree of reprehensibility of BMW's conduct." 4 The Court found that no aggravating elements were associated
with BMW's particular reprehensible conduct."' For example, Gore's
harm was purely economic, and BMW's conduct evinced no indifference to
6
or reckless disregard for the health and safety of others." Gore nevertheless argued that BMW's conduct was particularly reprehensible because
nondisclosure of the repairs to his car was part of a nationwide pattern of
The Court agreed that where a defendant repeatedly
tortious conduct.'
conduct while knowing or suspecting that the conduct
in
prohibited
engages
was unlawful would provide relevant support for an argument that greater
punitive damages may be required."' The Court, however, rejected this
contention because BMW could reasonably have interpreted the relevant
state statutes as inapplicable to minor repairs and because there was no
evidence that BMW acted in bad faith in determining what repairs should
be disclosed or that BMW persisted in its nondisclosure policy after it had
been ruled unlawful." 9 Lastly, there was no evidence that BMW engaged
in deliberate false statements, affirmative misconduct, or concealment of
evidence of improper motive to warrant particularly stringent punishment. 2 ' The Court concluded that, because BMW's conduct did not
exhibit circumstances ordinarily associated with improper conduct, BMW's
conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant a two million dollar

punitive damage award.' 2 '

113. Id.
114. Id. The Court stressed the importance of this factor based on its pedigree, in which
the Court pointed out that 150 years ago it had stressed that punitive damages imposed on
a defendant should reflect "the enormity of his offense." BMW of N. Am.. v. Gore, No. 94896, slip op. at 14 (U.S. May 20, 1996) (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371
(1852)). In addition, the Court believed that this factor followed the accepted principle that
some wrongs are more blameworthy than others. Id. at 15.
115. Id.at 15-16.
116. Id.at 16.

117. Id.
118.
119.
120.
121.

BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 16 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
Id.at 20.
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Next, the Court looked to the ratio between the plaintiff's compensatory
damages and his punitive damages.' 22 The Court first noted that it has
consistently refused to draw a constitutional line between actual and
potential damages and punitive damages.' 23 Nevertheless, the Court
determined that the two million dollar punitive damage award, five hundred
times the amount of Gore's actual harm as determined by the jury, does
"raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow."' 24
Finally, the Court compared the punitive damage award and the civil
or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. 25
On this point, the Court found that BMW's two million dollar punishment
was substantially greater than the statutory and judicial fines available in
Alabama and in other jurisdictions for similar actions. 26 Accordingly,
because BMW's actions were not particularly reprehensible, the ratio
between Gore's actual and punitive damages was rather high, and there were
no other comparative sanctions that could have been imposed on BMW, the
Court found that BMW was not provided with fair notice that it could be
subjected to a multi-million dollar verdict.' 27 Hence, the Court reversed
the Alabama Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case.' 28
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor
and Justice Souter, agreed with the judgment and reasoning of the majority
of the Court but focused more on procedural due process concerns.129
Justice Breyer began the analysis by stating that where "fair procedures were
followed, a judgment that is a product of that process is entitled to a strong

122. Id.
123. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 22 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
124. Id. at 23 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
482 (1993)).
125. Id.
126. Id. The maximum civil penalty for a violation of Alabama's Deceptive Trade
Practices Act is two thousand dollars. ALA. CODE §8-19-1 l(b) (1993). Other States impose
severe sanctions, ranging from five thousand to ten thousand dollars. Id. at 24 n. 40. In
addition to BMW's lack of notice of the severity of statutory fines, there does not appear to
be any judicial decision that would alert BMW that its policy might give rise to two million
dollar verdict against it at the time that BMW's policy was first challenged. BMW of N.
Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. 24-25 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
127. Id. at 13-14. The Court pointed out that the fact that BMW was a large corporation
rather than an individual does not diminish its rights to fair notice. Id. at 25-26. In fact, its
status in the national economy implicates the federal interest in preventing undue hindrances
on interstate commerce that unchecked punitive damages may create. Id. at 26.
128. Id.
129. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 1-12 (U.S. May 20, 1996)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
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presumption of validity .... ,,l30 However, the presumption is overcome
in this case.13' According to Justice Breyer, standards constraining punitive
damages are required not only to provide fair notice but also to assure the
uniform treatment of persons similarly situated, which protects against
purely arbitrary behavior. 32 In this case, Justice Breyer contended, the
violative of due process in
vagueness of Alabama's standards, although 13not
3
scrutiny.
close
Court's
the
invite
does
itself,
Justice Breyer began the inquiry by looking to the Alabama statute that
provides for punitive damages and found that the standard treated those not
similarly situated the same by not readily distinguishing between conduct
that warranted small exemplary damages from conduct that warranted large
exemplary damages. 34 Next, Justice Breyer examined the Alabama
13
1
courts' reliance on the factors espoused in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby.
Justice Breyer contended that, although the factors limited the jury's
discretion per se, the Alabama courts' application of them did not significantly prevent their ability to impose constitutionally unacceptable
awards. 36 Justice Breyer then searched for any other standard provided
by the state, such as community understanding, historical practice, or other
legislative enactments that would impose quantitative limits as checks on
jury discretion, and he found none. 37 In concluding that the presumption
of validity was overcome, Justice Breyer determined that the award violated
of nonarbitrary government behavior that due process
the basic guarantee
38
1
provides.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented and attacked the
Court's "unprecedented" invalidation of a state-court punitive assessment as
simply unreasonably large. 39 According to Justice Scalia, the Court's
actions were an unjustified intrusion into the province of state governments
because the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural guarantee assures an
opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a judgment for punitive

130. Id. at I (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993)).
131. Id. at 2.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id. at 3.
134. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 3-4 (U.S. May 20, 1996)(Breyer,
J., concurring).
135. 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989).
136. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 4-7 (U.S. May 20, 1996)(Breyer,
J.,
concurring).
137. Id. at 7-11.
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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damages in state court and was not intended to provide a federal guarantee

that a damage award be reasonable. 4 ° Justice Scalia further attacked the
Court's attempt to provide guidance to the lower courts, particularly through
the three guideposts, as too vague to be any guidance to legislatures and to
state and federal courts. 4 ' Moreover, Justice Scalia cautioned that the

majority inadvertently made every state civil suit involving evidentiary

sufficiency embody a constitutional question that would be subject to review

in the Supreme Court.'

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA V. GORE AS A GUIDE

There is clear protection in the Fourteenth Amendment against
deprivation of property without due process.'
The Court in BMW of
North America v. Gore acknowledged this for the first time in the punitive
damage arena when it invalidated a state-court punitive damage award as
being simply unreasonably large. 4 4 Despite the Court's good intentions
to defend due process rights in the area of punitive damages, it has taken the
wrong path by identifying a substantive due process right against grossly
excessive awards.""
The Court established this substantive due process right by attempting
to clarify the earlier "reasonableness and adequate guidance" standard'46

140. Id. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Along with Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, joined
by the Chief Justice, dissented. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896 (U.S. May 20, 1996)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). They agreed with Justice Scalia that the Court unnecessarily
intruded into an area "dominantly of state concern" and hinted that the majority's approach
to limiting punitive damages was too ambiguous to provide guidance. Id (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).

141. Id. at 5-9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 10-11.
143. The Fourteenth Amendment in pertinent part states that "[nior shall any State
deprive any person of... property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

144. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 2-3. The Court has recognized that excessive punitive damage awards might
have violated substantive due process as far back as 1919. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S.
Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919). Nevertheless, the Court in BMWofNorth America
v. Gore went against the tide of the substantive due process doctrine in that substantive due
process rights in the economic area have been on the decline since 1937. Gary T. Schwartz,
Browning-Ferris:The-Supreme Court'sEmergingMajorities,40ALA. L. REv. 1237, 1246-

50 (1989).
146. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
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through the use of three guidelines: the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct; the ratio between the plaintiffs actual or potential
harm and his punitive damage award; and the difference between the remedy
and other sanctions for comparable misconduct. 4 7 The Court's new test
still leaves a great deal of ambiguity for the lower courts, over which the
dissenting justices rightfully protested.
Even those who feel that the Court finally set forth a clearer constitu14 8
tional fiamework agree that many significant issues remain unresolved.
For instance, with the first guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility of
defendant's conduct, the Court found that conduct that created a purely
economic harm and posed no threat to the health or safety of others was not
reprehensible. The Court, however, provided no clarification as to conduct
that created physical or emotional harm. 49 Again, with the second guidepost, the Court's only measure in determining that a punitive damage award
may be unconstitutional is that the ratio between the punitive damage award
and actual or likely harm equal to or in excess of 500-to-I may be treated
as presumptively unconstitutional. 50 Such ambiguity fails to provide
notice to defendants. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the Court's
guidance in the punitive damage area, the Court should not indulge itself in
developing excessive punitive damage awards as a substantive due process
right. Rather, the Court's efforts would be better spent in developing
proce dural protection as advanced by Justice Breyer in his concurring

opinion. 151

Without having the Court engage in developing inflexible boundaries
in an area where many state legislatures plan to take or have already taken
action, 52 the Court should remain within its scope of power by focusing
147. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 14 (U.S. May 20, 1996).

148. Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Rule of Law: What 'sNextfor Punitive Damage Awards,
ST. J., May 29, 1996, at A19. The article further discusses that the Court's decision

WALL

to allow the jury award to reflect only the actions of BMW within Alabama as having

significant ramifications because plaintiffs' lawyers frequently urge juries to punish
defendants for nationwide conduct. Id. Moreover, the article mentions that, because of their

inability to look at a company's out-of-state activities, state juries may not be allowed to
calculate punitive damage from the company's wealth when its income is derived from

activities in other states. Id.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at I (U.S. May 20, 1996)(Breyer,
J., concurring).
152. Many state legislatures have already probed into the punitive damage award field
by proposing or enacting legislation intended to alter the availability of punitive damages.
Some legislation raises the burden of proof required to receive punitive damages to "clear and
convincing" proof. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (1992);
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on the procedural due process element of punitive damages and looking to
Matthews v. Eldridge'53 for guidance. In Eldridge,'54 the Court established a test to determine how much process is due by balancing three
factors: (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk that existing procedures
will wrongly impair this private interest and the likelihood that additional
or other procedural safeguards can effect a cure, and (3) the government's
interest. "5
Applying these factors, the Court should consider the defendant's
interest in avoiding excessive punitive damage awards and the government's
interest in punishing and deterring undesirable conduct. In addition, the
Court should look to current procedures, including jury instructions and trial
and appellate court review, to establish whether the defendant's interest is
sufficiently protected. It should then consider whether additional or other
procedures would better protect this interest, while considering the
government's interest in not providing these procedures. As a result, the
Court should establish a precedent whereby defendants will have notice of
the ramifications of their actions in terms of punitive damages and
legislatures and lower courts will be forced to take action to provide
adequate procedures. This would provide the type of flexibility the states
need, as the majority of the BMW Court contends, in controlling punitive
damage awards.' 56
B.

DISMAL IMPLICATIONS FROM SUPREME COURT ACTION

Despite the advantages of a procedural due process approach, the Court

attempted to dictate with great ambiguity when and if punitive damages
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1993); IND. CODE § 34-4-34-2 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-18-1 (1983). Colorado has even go so far as to require proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt." See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127 (West 1993). Other legislation actually
limits the amount of damages that can be awarded. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(a)-(b)
(West 1993) (punitive damages may not exceed three times the compensatory damages); GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (g) (Supp. 1993) (punitive damages shall not exceed $250,000). Still
other states have looked to more innovative measures, including allocating a certain amount
of the punitive damage award to a third party. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (e)(2) (Supp.
1995) (allocates approximately three-fourths ofpunitive damages to state treasury); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 537.675 (1994) (allocates half of punitive damage award after expenses and attorney
fees have been paid to the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund).
153. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Eldridge involved a constitutional challenge to the
administrative procedures for assessing whether a continuing disability exists. Id. The Court
upheld the procedures against a due process attack by applying the standard set forth above.

Id.

154. Id.
155. Id. at 335.
156. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 7 (U.S. May 20, 1996).
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should be awarded. This has dismal implications. First, as a practical
matter, the Court really does nothing to guide legislatures and lower courts
because of the ambiguity of the three guideposts."5 7 Second, the guideposts are a move toward undermining the function of the jury by dictating
what they should consider. Here, the Court does not give much weight to
the fact that the jury has historically awarded punitive damages' 58 and
requires flexibility in each situation'59 to determine when a punitive
6°
damages award will fulfill the goals of punishment and deterrence.
Third, the path the Court takes in BMW of North America v. Gore may
pose separation of powers issues. The primary goal behind punitive
damages is not to compensate but to deter and punish.'6 ' Punitive damages
62
regulate the activities of individuals, the primary goal of a legislature,'
not the Supreme Court.'6 3 Furthermore, where numerous states have
enacted or are considering legislation, the Supreme Court should have
deferred to the legislatures to the extent that such legislation does not exceed
constitutional boundaries or disturb the balance of power.
Finally, BMW of North America v. Gore may create problems for
federalism because it attempts to impose a national standard on state courts.
Several Justices have shared this concern regarding intrusions into the
domain of the states and have articulated these concerns throughout the
cases.165 Moreover, state law has historically determined punitive damag157. Id. at 8-9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. As far back as 1852, the jury's role in imposing punitive damages has been well
established in common law. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1852). The importance
of the jury in awarding punitive damages was reiterated in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30
(1983).
159. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993) (a jury
must consider various factors unique to the particular case before it).
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 908.
161. Id.
162. Several examples of a legislative power to regulate can be found in U.S. CONST.
art.I, § 8.
163. The Supreme Court's primary goal is to resolve cases and controversies. U.S.
CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Admittedly, the Supreme Court's power can also have a
regulatory effect. Nevertheless, the issue here becomes even more acute because many states
have taken some type of action, and the Supreme Court has decided to disregard this and has
established its own guidelines to limit punitive damages.
164. See supra note 153.

165. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 63 (1991) (in dissenting
Justice O'Connor stated that the determination of whether and how much to impose punitive
damages should be left to the states and not the Supreme Court); See BMW of N. Am. v.
Gore, No. 94-896, slip op. at 7 (U.S. May 20, 1996) (states should have substantial flexibility
in determining limits on punitive damages); Id. at 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the Court's
actions were an unjustified incursion into the province of state governments).
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es, 16 6 and attempts to limit punitive damages through federal legislation
have been futile.'67 If the Court continues on the path it paved by BMW
of North America v. Gore to disregard state sovereignty, the Court could
produce dire results for federalism.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has been eager to become part of the punitive
damage debate. Despite its many attempts at guiding punitive damage
awards, the Supreme Court's role in this controversy has remained
ambiguous at best. Indeed, the Court's three vague guideposts in BMW of
North America v. Gore only add to the confusion. Once more, the Court
may continue this aggressive stance found in BMW of North America v.
Gore in limiting punitive damages and further complicate the debate by
creating issues involving the jury's function in awarding punitive damages,
the balance of power between the legislature and judiciary, and the
boundaries between the federal and state governments. Rather than
compound the debate, the best stance for the Supreme Court to take is none
at all. The states are competent to engage in substantive punitive damage
reform.
MICHELLE J. CAREY

166. Elizabeth H. Sperow, ConstitutionalLaw: TXO Production Corporation v.
Alliance Resources Corporation Ruling Leaves Defendants Who Assert Due Process
Challengesto PunitiveDamage Awards Still Searchingfor a Compass, 47 OKLA. L. REV.
355, 357 (1994).
167. PunitiveReform TakesA Step, Bus. INS., May 27, 1996, at 8. Some attempts have
been made by Congress to control punitive awards. Id. One broad tort reform bill that
limited punitive damages was approved by the House of Representatives only to fail in the
Senate. Id. A product liability reform bill that contained a formula to allocate punitive
damages was approved by both houses only to be vetoed by the President. Id.

